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Do scientific theories build cumulatively on the achievements of their
predecessors, or do they sweep them away in favour of new theoretical visions?
Philosophers are sometimes accused—by scientists, and by philosophers—of
generating pseudoquestions by imposing their own abstractions on science.
The question of theoretical cumulativity is not like that, for it has been raised
by people who are not (or not primarily) philosophers. Here for instance is
Henri Poincaré on the “bankruptcy of science”:
The ephemeral nature of scientific theories takes by surprise the
man of the world. Their brief period of prosperity ended, he sees
them abandoned one after another; he sees ruins piled upon ruins;
he predicts that the theories in fashion to-day will in a short time
succumb in their turn, and he concludes that they are absolutely
in vain. This is what he calls the bankruptcy of science. (Poincaré
1905, 178)
It is well known among philosophers that Poincaré, having identified
that pessimistic line of thought, went on to reject it, at least partially. It
is not so well known among philosophers that some thirty years later,1 in
his Presidential Address to the Chemical Society (later to become the Royal
Society of Chemistry), Nevil Sidgwick sketched a much more robust defence
of cumulativity in the development of theories of chemical structure:
* Robin Hendry is Professor of Philosophy at Durham University, where he has worked for
a long time. His chief research interests are in the history and philosophy of chemistry
and its relationship to physics.
1 I do not know whether Poincaré’s musings had any influence on Sidgwick’s, whether
direct or indirect.
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There are two ideas about the progress of science which are
widely prevalent, and which appear to me to be both false and
pernicious. The first is the notion that when a new discovery
is made, it shows the previous conceptions on the subject to
be untrue; from which unscientific people draw the very natural
conclusion that if to-day’s scientific ideas show those of yesterday
to be wrong, we need not trouble about them, because they may
themselves be shown to be wrong to-morrow. It is difficult to
imagine any statement more opposed to the facts. The progress
of knowledge does indeed correct certain details in our ideas,
but the main result of every great discovery is to establish the
existing doctrines on a firmer foundation, and give them a deeper
meaning. (Sidgwick 1936, 533)
Leaving aside the second of his pernicious falsehoods, Sidgwick’s
conclusion is forthright:
I hope I have said enough to show that the modern development of
the structural theory, far from destroying the older doctrine, has
given it a longer and a fuller life; and further that the tendency
of modern research is not to contract the scope of its material,
but on the contrary to call in to its assistance an increasingly
wide range of properties, and to bring to bear on its problems
the results of every kind of physical and chemical investigation.
(Sidgwick 1936, 538)
Sidgwick’s thoughts suggest a bold historiographical hypothesis, whose
relevance to the current debate on scientific realism should be obvious:
that theories of structure and composition have, since the 1860s, developed
through a series of conservative extensions, despite some apparently radical
theoretical and conceptual change during this time. A conservative extension
of a theory is one where its inferential content before the extension (i.e., that
which determines its explanatory and predictive power) is a proper subset
of its inferential content afterwards.2 This will happen, for instance, when
a theory is extended or reinterpreted so as to allow inferences to be made
about a new range of phenomena.
2 Mauricio Suárez (2004) presents a deflationary account of representation: inferential use
exhausts what can usefully be said about representation. Whether or not one agrees
with that, inference is certainly a very useful way to track the interpretation of a
representation by its users.
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II. Stability and structure
Of course our bold historiographical claim is really a sequence of
hypotheses concerning the retention of specific structural features attributed
by chemists to molecules. Four key developments suggest themselves for
further study: the emergence of structural formulae to account for isomerism
in the 1860s; the extension of structure into three dimensions in the 1870s;
integration with physical theories and experimental methods in the early
twentieth century; and the advent of quantum mechanics from the 1930s
onwards.
Bond structure in organic chemistry (1860s)
As a body of theory, molecular structure presents a number of
apparent difficulties for historians and philosophers of science, posed by its
presentation, and by its interpretation. These difficulties can be addressed if
we pay careful attention to the inferential uses to which the various visual
representations are put, and which reflect sophisticated interpretative stances
that the chemists took toward their representational schemes.
Presentation: In organic chemistry, structures were represented using a
diverse range of representational media, including August Kekulé’s sausage
formulae, A.W. Hofmann’s “glyptic formulae” and the chemical graphs of
Alexander Crum Brown and Edward Frankland (for examples see Rocke 2010,
ch. 5). Moreover the visual nature of these representations (as opposed to,
say, mathematical equations) can make it difficult to identify the predictive
and explanatory content of the theory. Nevertheless, underlying this diversity
of presentation was a relatively unified body of theory, based on the core idea
of fixed atomic valences generating a fixed number of ways a given collection
of atoms of different kinds can be connected together via bonds (see Rocke
1984, 2010).
Interpretation: The theory was developed amid considerable controversy
concerning the reality of atoms (see Brock and Knight 1967), and whether
hypotheses about structure at the atomic scale could have any legitimate
role in chemistry. The resulting interpretative caution among the chemists
of the time has been understood by historians and philosophers as a form of
instrumentalism. It was that, but the label could obscure finer interpretative
distinctions to be observed in the way the theories were being used. Like many
chemists at the time, Frankland was careful to point out that structural
formulae were intended “to represent neither the shape of the molecules,
nor the relative position of the constituent atoms” (see Biggs et al. 1976,
59). William Brock and David Knight have described Frankland as one of
the “moderate conventionalists” about structural formulae, people who are
“prepared to employ them as useful fictions” (1967, 21). Elsewhere (2010) I
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have argued that Frankland’s stance also reflects an awareness that the use of
structural formulae in chemical explanations required inferences to be made
only concerning the order of the connections between the atoms as they affect
the identity or diversity of different substances. Although the representations
carry excess content, Frankland would make inferences only concerning the
bond topology:
The lines connecting the different atoms of a compound, and
which might with equal propriety be drawn in any other direction,
provided they connected together the same elements, serve only
to show the definite disposal of the bonds: thus the formula for
nitric acid indicates that two of the three constituent atoms of
oxygen are combined with nitrogen alone, whilst the third oxygen
atom is combined both with nitrogen and hydrogen. (Frankland,
quoted in Biggs et al. 1976, 59)
The shapes of the molecules and the relative positions of the atoms played
no more part in the representation than the particular colours chosen to
represent the different kinds of atoms in Hofmann’s glyptic formulae. All
of this reflects the conventionalist’s awareness that a given “fiction” will be
useful for some things and not for others.
Stereochemistry (1870s)
The explanatory scope of the structural formulae was soon extended so
that inferences could be made about the relative positions of the atoms
in a molecule. In 1874, Jacobus van ’t Hoff explained why there are two
isomers of compounds in which four different groups are attached to a single
carbon atom by supposing that the valences are arranged tetrahedrally (with
the two isomers conceived of as mirror images of each other). Adolf von
Baeyer explained the instability and reactivity of some organic compounds
by reference to strain in their molecules, which meant their distortion away
from some preferred structure (see Ramberg 2003, Chs. 3 and 4). These
stereochemical theories were intrinsically spatial, because their explanatory
power depended precisely on their describing the arrangement of atoms in
space. The extension of the theory did not require a wholesale revision of
the structures that had previously been assigned to organic substances: they
were simply embedded in space, allowing new classes of inference to be made.
Hence stereochemistry constituted a conservative extension of the earlier
structural theory of the 1860s.
Structure in motion (1920s onwards)
The structural formulae of the nineteenth century are sometimes
described as static. This can be misleading. Nineteenth-century chemists
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clearly entertained the thought that matter must be dynamic at the atomic
scale, but they had no means to make reliable inferences about any such
motions. Hence they did not make any. The structural formulae may have
been static, but they were not interpreted as representing molecules to be
static. This caution began to change in the twentieth century. In 1911, Nils
Bjerrum applied the “old” quantum theory to the motions of molecules and
their interaction with radiation, potentially explaining their spectroscopic
behaviour (see Assmus 1992). From the 1920s onwards, Christopher Ingold
and others applied G.N. Lewis’s understanding of the covalent bond as
deriving from the sharing of electrons to give detailed insight into reaction
mechanisms. These explained how, when chemical reactions occur, the
structure of the reagents transforms into the structure of the products (see
Brock 1992, ch. 14; Goodwin 2007). These developments were based on
conservative extensions of the structures that emerged in the nineteenth
century, allowing inferences to be made about their motions, and providing
explanations of various spectroscopic and kinetic phenomena that had not
previously been within the scope of structural theory.
Quantum chemistry
What prospects are there for extending this argument into the era
of quantum mechanics? This might seem like a hopeless task: surely the
quantum-mechanical molecule is radically different from the classical one!
But this is too quick. Firstly, “classical” chemical structures are not classical
in any way that has a direct connection with physics. They involve no
application of (for instance) classical mechanics or Boltzmann statistics.
Secondly, when quantum mechanics did come to be applied to molecules
in the 1920s and 30s, the resultant Schrödinger equations were insoluble. To
make progress, chemists and physicists developed semi-empirical methods
that amounted to retaining classical structure by simple inclusion. This is
why Linus Pauling, for instance, regarded quantum chemistry as a synthesis
of “classical” structure and quantum mechanics (for details see Hendry
2010). By the 1980s, the development of density-functional theory allowed
theoretical chemists to compute accurate electron-density distributions for
molecules, which were used by Richard Bader (1990) to define structures
which could be interpreted as corresponding to the traditional atoms and
bond topologies of molecules. The details are quite interesting: for a given
molecule, use its electron-density distribution to define “bond paths” between
atoms. These bond paths generate a “molecular graph” for the molecule.
In many cases the resulting molecular graph is strikingly close to the
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classical structure for the molecule.3 As Bader puts it, “The recovery of a
chemical structure in terms of a property of the system’s charge density is a
most remarkable and important result” (1990, 33). But the correspondence
between bond path and chemical bond is not perfect. The main problems
concern repulsive (rather than attractive) interactions between neighbouring
atoms in a molecule. Bader’s algorithm finds bond paths corresponding to
these repulsive interactions, even though chemists would not normally regard
the mutually repelling pairs of atoms as bonded to each other. One response
is to defend these “bonds” as bonds (see Bader 2006), which looks like
bullet-biting. Too much of that will undermine the revisionary analysis one
is seeking to defend.
III. Structure and Scientific Realism
I will conclude with brief discussions of three ways in which I think the
historical development of structural theory can inform scientific realism.
Pessimistic induction
The development of structural theory from the 1860s to the 1920s would
seem to provide a refreshing contrast to the historical case studies usually
cited as grounds for pessimistic induction. Frankland was able to identify
which features of his representations should be taken seriously, and more
than 150 years later these very features are preserved. Perhaps structure
in chemistry supports, rather than confutes, the cumulativity of science.
The arrival of quantum chemistry provides a more complex example. In the
early years, the best explanation of the retention of classical structure in the
quantum-mechanical molecular models is no doubt chemists’ wish to find
it there, and their resulting inclusion of it “by hand.” No realist inference
seems required. On the other hand, Bader’s results seem to show something
significant, but just what they show depends on the details of his algorithm.
How loose or strict are the constraints on defining molecular graphs? How
many independent parameters are there? How significant, from an ontological
point of view, is electron density, the quantity in terms of which the molecular
graphs are defined? How troubling are the false positives, the bonds found
by the algorithm where no chemist would put them? On all these desiderata
except the last, I would argue that Bader’s algorithm scores highly.
3 Bader (1990, 72-3) provides molecular graphs for an impressive range of aliphatic
hydrocarbons.
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Unconceived alternatives
Structural theory is also relevant to Kyle Stanford’s skeptical view of
eliminative inference (2006), in two ways: firstly, van ’t Hoff arrived at his
version of structural theory via eliminative reasoning; secondly, eliminative
reasoning in modern chemistry works within a framework of structural
possibility defined by this theory. How did van ’t Hoff arrive at the
tetrahedron? Following Johannes Wislicenus, he argued first that it was
possible to account for the observed number and variety of the isomers of
certain organic substances only by taking into account the arrangement of
atoms in space. He then defended a tetrahedral geometry for the carbon
atom by rejecting a square planar arrangement: if carbon’s geometry were
square planar, there would be more isomers of substituted methane than
are observed.4 Assuming a tetrahedral arrangement, in contrast, would be
in accord with the observed number of isomers (see Brock 1992, 260). The
structural theory developed in the 1870s still provides the space of theoretical
possibility within which the normal science of structural thinking is pursued.
Roald Hoffmann (1995, ch. 29) provides a beautiful example of explicitly
eliminative reasoning in his discussion of how H. Okabe and J. R. McNesby
used isotopic labelling to eliminate two out of three possible mechanisms for
the photolysis of ethane to ethylene.
While Stanford seeks to circumscribe the skeptical problem that
unconceived alternatives pose for eliminative inference (2006, 32), here we
have everyday scientific inferences that could be expected to be reliable
just in case we can trust a broad framework of theory that was itself
arrived at by elimination. Is Hoffmann allowed his inference? What is
also striking is the extent to which, between the 1860s and the 1950s,
molecular structure became much less remote from experience. In the 1860s,
structures were regarded as highly speculative, like string theory today.
Rightly so: the sole basis for attributing a structure to a substance was the
inferences this would allow one to make about the chemical reactions it would
undergo. Through the successive introduction of X-ray diffraction, infrared
spectroscopy, and nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy (and more
importantly their mutual reinforcement), molecular structures became the
objects of (indirect) observation. But if eliminative reasoning is so unreliable,
this should be surprising. How lucky for us that those Victorian chemists
were able to conceive of the theoretical possibilities that would underwrite a
hundred years of conservative extension, and would be vindicated by indirect
observation via physical methods whose existence was unimaginable at the
time. Or perhaps van ’t Hoff’s reasoning was reliable. It is plausible that
4 For instance, disubstituted methane (of the form CH2X2) would have two isomers if it
were square planar, whereas only one could be found.
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eliminative reasoning is reliable to different extents in different contexts, but
the question is, what makes the difference? Of its very nature, structural and
geometrical possibility may just have been more amenable to eliminative
reasoning as wielded by a nineteenth-century chemist than the spaces of
theoretical possibility appearing in Stanford’s own examples (early thinking
about mechanisms of biological heritability). Or maybe epistemic luck plays
a role: the historically contingent development of organic chemistry during
the nineteenth century delivers to van ’t Hoff as a plausible assumption the
very premise that would render an eliminative inference valid.
The ontological reliability of the special sciences
It is common among both philosophers and scientists to entertain the
possibility that classical molecular structure is but a figment, a heuristic
device that worked well enough for the nineteenth century but must be
discarded today, at least as describing a real feature of the world. The basis
for the rejection is its supposed incompatibility with quantum mechanics,
which presents us with a microscopic world of Heraclitean strangeness that
cannot accommodate the balls and sticks of molecular structure. I think
this is a misinterpretation of both molecular structure and of quantum
mechanics (at least as that theory is applied by physicists), but it seems
additionally unfair given just how long structural theory has been around.
Here is a line of thought to counter this epistemic injustice: if structural
thinking in chemistry really is as cumulative as it seems,5 this would also
make it an interesting contrast with physics, within which philosophers
have sometimes struggled to identify continuity across theory change.
Chemistry interprets its theories in ways that render them solid enough to
constitute a lasting foundation for later achievements, unlike its neighbouring
discipline, now revealed as a flighty follower of ontological fashion. Maybe
the difference is in the interpretative caution. To dispassionate observers,
some parts of physics (and the philosophy of physics) seem to get lost in a
thicket of speculative metaphysical hypotheses generated by taking far too
seriously abstract mathematical features of the dynamics of fundamental
theories (multiverses, wavefunctions in 3N-dimensional configuration space
replacing 3-dimensional space, etc.), even though the truth or falsity of those
speculative hypotheses could make no difference to the reasoning that makes
those theories testable.6 Chemistry has long regarded itself as cautious and
5 I have not even mentioned the remarkable stability of compositional claims about
compound substances since the chemical revolution. Nor have I discussed in any
detail how commensuration with physics genuinely deepened structural explanation in
chemistry, as Sidgwick argued.
6 I was once told by a philosopher of physics that I could stop worrying about the problem
of reducing molecular structure to physics if only I could embrace the multiverse.
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pragmatic, and chooses to be serious only about the parts of its theories with
which it can make inferences. Perhaps philosophers should also be wary of
regarding physics as the only “ontological science”, and should be cautious
about overwriting the results of the special sciences with (possibly highly
revisionary) reinterpretations based on the latest speculative interpretation
of a physical theory. The problem is not with physics or physical theory, but
with where we focus our ontological attention: we should not prioritize the
axioms of a theory over its applications, when it is in the latter that all the
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